Retrocausal Effects as a Consequence of Orthodox Quantum Mechanics
  Refined to Accommodate The Principle of Sufficient Reason by Stapp, Henry P.
  1 
   Retrocausal Effects As A Consequence of                        
         Orthodox Quantum Mechanics Refined To           
          Accommodate The Principle Of Sufficient    
                                    Reason. 
 
                           HENRY P. STAPP 
                           LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY 
                                               UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
                                            BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720 
                                                            JULY 18, 2011 
           
Abstract. The principle of sufficient reason asserts that anything that happens does so for a reason: no 
definite state of affairs can come into being unless there is a sufficient reason why that particular thing 
should happen. This principle is usually attributed to Leibniz, although the first recorded Western 
philosopher to use it was Anaximander of Miletus. The demand that nature be rational, in the sense that it 
be compatible with the principle of sufficient reason, conflicts with a basic feature of contemporary 
orthodox physical theory, namely the notion that nature’s response to the probing action of an observer is 
determined by pure chance, and hence on the basis of absolutely no reason at all. This appeal to pure 
chance can be deemed to have no rational fundamental place in reason-based Western science. It is argued 
here, on the basis of the other basic principles of quantum physics, that in a world that conforms to the 
principle of sufficient reason, the usual quantum statistical rules will naturally emerge at the pragmatic 
level, in cases where the reason behind nature’s choice of response is unknown, but that the usual statistics 
can become biased in an empirically manifest and effectively retrocausal way when the reason for the 
choice is empirically identifiable. It is shown here that if the statistical laws of quantum mechanics were to 
be biased in this way then the basically forward-in-time unfolding of empirical reality described by 
orthodox quantum mechanics would generate the appearances of backward-time-effects of the kind that 
have been reported in the scientific literature.   
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     INTRODUCTION 
 
An article recently published by the Cornell psychologist Daryl J. Bem [1] in 
a distinguished psychology journal has provoked a heated discussion in the 
New York Times. Among the discussants was Douglas Hofstadter who 
wrote that: “If any of his claims were true, then all of the bases underlying 
contemporary science would be toppled, and we would have to rethink 
everything about the nature of the universe.”   
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It is, I believe, an exaggeration to say that if any of Bem’s claims were true 
then “all of the bases underlying contemporary science would be toppled” 
and that “we would have to rethink everything about the nature of the 
universe”. In fact, all that is required is a relatively small change in the rules, 
and one that seems reasonable and natural in its own right.  The major part 
of the required rethinking was done already by the founders of quantum 
mechanics, and cast in more rigorous form by John von Neumann [2], more 
than eighty years ago. 
 
According to the precepts of classical mechanics, once the physically 
described universe is created, it evolves in a deterministic manner that is 
completely fixed by mathematical laws that depend only on the present, or 
previously determined, values of evolving physically described properties. 
There are no inputs to the dynamics that go beyond what is specified by 
those physically described properties. [Here physically described properties 
are properties that are specified by assigning mathematical properties to 
space-time points, or to very tiny regions.] The increasing knowledge of 
human and other biological agents enters only as an output of the physically 
described evolution of the universe, and even nature itself is not allowed to 
interfere with the algorithmically determined mechanistic evolution.  
 
This one-way causation from the physical to the empirical/epistemological 
has always been puzzling: Why should “knowledge” exist at all if cannot 
influence anything physical, and hence be of no use to the organisms that 
possess it. And how can something like an “idea”, seemingly so different 
from physical matter, as matter is conceived of in classical mechanics, be 
created by, or simply be, the motion of physical matter? 
 
But the basic precepts of classical mechanics are now known to be 
fundamentally incorrect: they cannot be reconciled with a plenitude of 
empirical facts discovered and verified during the twentieth century. Thus 
there is no reason to demand or believe that those puzzling properties of the 
classically conceived world must carry over to the real world, which 
conforms far better to the radically different precepts of quantum mechanics.  
 
The founders of quantum theory conceived the theory to be a mathematical 
procedure for making practical predictions about future empirical-
experiential findings on the basis of our present knowledge. According to 
this idea, quantum theory is basically about the evolution of knowledge. This 
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profound shift is proclaimed by Heisenberg’s assertion [3] that the quantum 
mathematics “represents no longer the behavior of the elementary particles 
but rather our knowledge of this behavior”, and by Bohr’s statement [4] that 
“Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics 
merely offers rules of calculation for the deduction of expectation about 
observations obtained under conditions defined by classical physics 
concepts.” 
 
The essential need to bring “observations” into the theoretical structure 
arises from the fact that evolution via the Schroedinger equation, which is 
the quantum analog of the classical equations of motion, produces in general 
not a single evolving physical world that is compatible with human 
experience and observations, but rather a mathematical structure that 
corresponds to an increasingly smeared out mixture of many such worlds. 
Consequently, some additional process, beyond the one generated by 
Schroedinger equation, is needed to specify what the connection is between 
empirical/experiential findings and the physically described quantum state of 
the universe. Epistemological factors become thereby intertwined with the 
mathematically described physical aspects of the quantum mechanical 
conception of nature. 
 
The founders of quantum mechanics achieved an important advance in our 
understanding of nature when they recognized that the mathematically-
physically described universe that appears in our best physical theory 
represents not the world of material substance contemplated in the classical 
physics of Isaac Newton and his direct successors, but rather a world of 
potentialities or possibilities for our future acquisitions of knowledge. It is 
not surprising that a scientific theory designed to allow us to predict 
correlations between our shared empirical findings should incorporate, as 
orthodox quantum mechanics does: 1), a natural place for “our knowledge”, 
which is both all that is really known to us, and also the empirical foundation 
upon which science is based; 2), an account of the process by means of 
which we acquire our conscious knowledge of  certain physically described 
aspects of nature; and 3), a statistical description, at the pragmatic level, of 
relationships between various features of the growing aspect of nature that 
constitutes “our knowledge”. What is perhaps surprising is the ready 
acceptance by most western-oriented scientists and philosophers of the 
notion that the element of chance that enters quite reasonably into the 
pragmatic formulation of physical theory, in a practical context where many 
pertinent things may be unknown to us, stems from an occurrence of raw 
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pure chance at the underlying ontological level.  Ascribing such 
capriciousness to nature herself would seem to contradict the rationalist 
ideals of Western Science. From a strictly rational point of view, it not 
unreasonable to examine the mathematical impact of accepting, at the basic 
ontological level, Einstein’s dictum that: “God does not play dice with the 
universe”, and to attribute the effective entry of pure chance at the pragmatic 
level to our lack of knowledge of the reasons for the “choices on the part of 
nature” to be what they turn out to be.   
 
These “random” quantum choices are key elements of orthodox quantum 
mechanics, and the origin of these choices is therefore a fundamental issue. 
Are they really purely random, as contemporary orthodox theory asserts? Or 
could they stem at the basic ontological level from sufficient reasons? 
 
It is well known---as will be reviewed presently---that biasing the weights of 
the random quantum choices, relative to the weights prescribed by orthodox 
quantum theory, leads to an apparent breakdown of the normal causal 
structure of phenomena. This breakdown of the causal structure dovetails 
neatly with the empirical findings reported by Bem, and the similar 
retrocausal findings reported earlier by others [5,6]. In particular, the 
rejection of the intrinsically “irrational” idea that definite choices can pop 
out of nothing at all, and the acceptance, instead, of the principle of 
sufficient reason, yields a rational revision of orthodox quantum mechanics 
that can naturally accommodate the reported retrocausal phenomena, while 
preserving most of orthodox quantum mechanics. This revision allows 
nature’s choices to provide more high-level guidance to the evolution of the 
universe than the known-to-be-false precepts of classical mechanics allow. 
 
 
 
    IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT  
                                        REASON 
 
I make no judgment on the significance of the purported evidence for the 
existence of various retrocausal phenomena. That I leave to the collective 
eventual wisdom of the scientific community. I am concerned here rather 
with essentially logical and mathematical issues, as they relate to the 
apparent view of some commentators that scholarly articles reporting the 
existence of retrocausal phenomena should be banned from the scientific 
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literature, essentially for the reason articulated in the New York Times by 
Douglas Hofstadter, namely that the actual existence of such phenomena is 
irreconcilable with what we now (think we) know about the structure of the 
universe; that the actual existence of such phenomena would require a 
wholesale abandonment of basic ideas of contemporary physics. That 
assessment is certainly not valid, as will be shown here. Only a limited, and 
intrinsically reasonable, modification of the existing orthodox QM is needed 
in order to accommodate the reported data. 
 
In order for science to be able to confront effectively purported phenomena 
that violate the prevailing basic theory what is needed is an alternative 
theory that retains the valid predictions of the currently prevailing theory, 
yet accommodates in a rationally coherent way the purported new 
phenomena. 
 
If the example of the transition from classical physics to quantum physics 
can serve as an illustration, in that case we had a beautiful theory that had 
worked well for 200 years, but that was incompatible with the new data 
made available by advances in technology. However, a new theory was 
devised that was closely connected to the old one, and that allowed us to 
recapture the old results in the appropriate special cases, where the effects of 
the nonzero value of Planck’s constant could be ignored. The old formalism 
was by-and-large retained, but readjusted to accommodate the fact that pq-
qp was non-zero. Yet there was also a rejection of a basic classical 
presupposition, namely the idea that a physical theory should properly be 
exclusively about connections between physically described material events. 
The founders of quantum theory insisted [7] that their physical theory was a 
pragmatic theory --- i.e., was directed at predicting practically useful 
connections between empirical  (i.e., experienced) events.   
 
This original pragmatic Copenhagen QM was not suited to be an ontological 
theory, because of the movable boundary between the aspects of nature 
described in classical physical terms and those described in quantum 
physical terms. It is certainly not ontologically realistic to believe that the 
pointers on observed measuring devices are built out of classically 
conceivable electrons and atoms, etc. The measuring devices, and also the 
bodies and brains of human observers, must be understood to be built out of 
quantum mechanically described particles. That is what allows us to 
understand and describe many observed properties of these physically 
described systems, such as their rigidity and electrical conductance.  
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Von Neumann’s analysis of the measurement problem allowed the quantum 
state of the universe to describe the entire physically described universe: 
everything that we naturally conceive to be built out of atomic constituents 
and the fields that they generate. This quantum state is described by 
assigning mathematical properties to space-time points (or tiny regions). We 
have a deterministic law, the Schroedinger equation, that specifies the 
mindless, essentially mechanical, evolution of this quantum state. But this 
quantum mechanical law of motion generates a huge continuous smear of 
worlds of the kind that we actually experience. For example, as Einstein 
emphasized, the position of the pointer on a device that is supposed to tell us 
the time of the detection of a particle produced by the decay of a radioactive 
nucleus, evolves, under the control of the Schroedinger equation, into a 
continuous smear of positions corresponding to all the different possible 
times of detection; not to a single position, which is what we observe. And 
the unrestricted validity of the Schroedinger equation would lead, as also 
emphasized by Einstein, to the conclusion that the moon, as it is represented 
in the theory, would be smeared out over the entire night sky. How do we 
understand this huge disparity between the representation of the universe 
evolving in accordance with the Schroedinger equation and the empirical 
reality that we experience?  
 
An adequate physical theory must include a logically coherent explanation 
of how the mathematical/physical description is connected to the 
experienced empirical realities. This demands, in the final analysis, a theory 
of the mind-brain connection: a theory of how our discrete conscious 
thoughts are connected to the evolving physically described state of the 
universe, and to our evolving physically described brains. 
 
The micro-macro separation that enters into Copenhagen QM is actually a 
separation between what is described in quantum mechanical physical terms 
and what is described in terms of our experiences---expressed in terms of 
our everyday concepts of the physical world, refined by the concepts of 
classical physics. ([7], Sec. 3.5.) 
 
To pass from quantum pragmatism to quantum ontology one can treat all 
physically described aspects quantum mechanically, as Von Neumann did. 
He effectively transformed the Copenhagen pragmatic version of QM into a 
potentially ontological version by shifting the brains and bodies of the 
observers---and all other physically described aspects of the theory---into the 
  7 
part described in quantum mechanical language. The entire physically 
described universe is treated quantum mechanically, and our knowledge, and 
the process by means of which we acquire our knowledge about the 
physically described world, were elevated to essential features of the theory, 
not merely postponed, or ignored! Thus certain aspects of reality that had 
been treated superficially in the earlier classical theories---namely “our 
knowledge” and “the process by means of which we acquire our 
knowledge”--- were now incorporated into the theory in a detailed way.  
 
Specifically, each acquisition of knowledge was postulated to involve, first, 
an initiating probing action executed by an “observer”, followed by “a 
choice on the part of nature” of a response to the agent’s request (demand) 
for this particular piece of experientially specified information. 
 
This response on the part of nature is asserted by orthodox quantum 
mechanics to be controlled by random chance, by a throw of nature’s dice, 
with the associated probabilities specified purely in terms of physically 
described properties. These “random” responses create a sequence of 
collapses of the quantum state of the universe, with the universe created at 
each stage concordant with the new state of “our knowledge”.  
 
If nature’s choices conform strictly to these orthodox statistical rules then 
the retrocausal results reported by Bem cannot be accommodated. However, 
if nature is not capricious---if God does not play dice with the universe---but 
nature’s choices have sufficient reasons, then, given the central role of “our 
knowledge” in quantum mechanics, it becomes reasonable to consider the 
possibility that nature’s choices are not completely determined in the purely 
mechanical way specified by the orthodox rules, but can be biased away 
from the orthodox rules in ways that depend upon the character of the 
knowledge/experiences that these choices are creating. The results reported 
by Bem can then be explained in simple way, and nature is elevated from a 
basically physical process to a basically psychophysical process. 
  
The question is then: What sort of biasing will suffice? One possibly 
adequate answer is a biasing that favors positive experiences and disfavors 
negative experiences, where positive means pleasing and helpful, and 
negative means unpleasant and unhelpful. 
 
In classical statistical physics such a biasing of the statistics would not 
produce the appearance of retrocausation. But in quantum mechanics it 
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does! The way that the biasing of the quantum statistical rules leads to 
seemingly “retrocausal” effects will now be explained. 
 
 
     BACKWARD IN TIME EFFECTS IN QUANTUM MECHANICS 
 
The idea that choices made now can influence what has already happened 
needs to be clarified, for this idea is, in some basic sense, incompatible with 
our classical idea of the meaning of time. Yet the empirical results of 
Wheeler’s delayed choice experiments are saying that, in some sense, what 
we choose to investigate now can influence what happened in the past. This 
backward-in-time aspect of QM is neatly captured by an assertion made in 
the recent book "The Grand Design" by Hawking and Mlodinow: "We create 
history by our observations, history does not create us". (p.140) 
 
How can one make rationally coherent sense out of this strange feature of 
QM? 
 
I believe that the most satisfactory way is to introduce the concept of 
"process time". This is a "time" that is different from the "Einstein time" of 
classical deterministic physics. That classical time is the time that is joined 
to physically described space to give classical Einstein space-time. (See my 
chapter in "Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time" SUNY, 1986, 
Ed. David Ray Griffiths. In this book three physicists, D. Bohm, I. 
Prigogine, and I set forth basic ideas pertaining to time.) 
 
Orthodox quantum mechanics features the phenomena of collapses (or 
reductions) of the evolving quantum mechanical state. In orthodox 
Tomonaga-Schwinger relativistic quantum field theory the quantum state 
collapses not on an advancing sequence of constant time surfaces (lying at a 
sequence of times t(n), with t(n+1)>t(n), as in nonrelativistic QM), but rather 
on an advancing sequence of space-like surfaces sigma(n). (For each n, 
every point on the spacelike surface sigma(n) is spacelike displaced from 
every other point on sigma(n), and every point on sigma(n+1) either 
coincides with a point on sigma(n), or lies in the open future light-cone of 
some points on sigma(n), but not in the open backward light-cone of any 
point of sigma(n).) 
 
At each surface sigma(n) a projection operator P(n), or its complement  
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P'(n)=(I-P(n)), acts to reduce the quantum state to some part of its former 
self. 
 
For each surface sigma(n) there is a "block universe" defined by extending 
the quantum state on sigma(n) both forward and backward in time via the 
unitary time evolution operator generated by the Schroedinger equation. Let 
the index n that labels the surfaces sigma(n) be called "process time". Then 
for each instant n of process time a “new history” is defined by the 
backward-in-time evolution from the newly created state on sigma(n). All 
predictions about the future are "as if" the future state is the smooth forward 
continuation from the newly created past. This newly created past is the 
"effective past", in the sense that the future prediction is given by taking this 
newly created past to be the past. All empirical traces of the earlier past are 
eliminated by the quantum collapse. 
 
In orthodox QM each instant of process time corresponds to an  
"observation": the collapse at process time n reduces the former quantum 
state to the part of itself that is compatible with the increased knowledge 
generated by the new observation. This continual re-creation of the effective 
past is perhaps the strangest feature of orthodox quantum mechanics, and the 
origin of its other strange features. 
 
The actual physical universe is generated by the always-forward-moving 
creative process. It is forward-moving in the sense that the sequence of 
surfaces sigma(n) advances into the future. But this forward-moving creative 
process generates in its wake an associated sequence of revised effective 
"histories". 
 
Two key features of von Neumann’s rules are mathematical formalizations 
of two basic features of the earlier pragmatic Copenhagen interpretation of 
Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and Dirac. In association with each observation 
there is a “choice on the part of the observer” of what aspect of nature will 
be probed, with an empirically recognizable possible outcome “Yes”, and an 
associated projection operator P(n) that, if it acts on the prior quantum state 
rho, reduces that prior state to the part of itself compatible with the 
knowledge gleaned from the experiencing of the specified outcome “Yes”.   
 
The process that generates the observer’s choice of the probing action is not 
specified by contemporary quantum mechanics: this choice is, in this very 
specific sense, a “free choice on the part of the experimenter.” Once this 
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choice of probing action is made and executed, then, in Dirac’s words, there 
is “a choice on the part of nature”: nature randomly selects the outcome, 
“Yes” or “No” in accordance with the statistical rule specified by quantum 
theory. If nature’s choice is “Yes” then P(n) acts on the prior quantum state 
rho, and if nature’s answer is “No” then the complementary projection 
operator P’(n)=(I-P(n)) acts on the prior state. Multiple-choice observations 
are accommodated by decomposing the possibility “No” into sub-
possibilities “Yes” and “No”. 
 
All this is just standard quantum mechanics, elaborated to give a rationally 
coherent ontological account compatible with the standard computational 
rules and predictions.  
 
The salient point for us is this.  Suppose at some time T (in the past) a 
system S interacts with a measuring/recording system MR in a way that 
records in MR the value of a property P(T) of S at time T, whereupon MR 
moves away from S. And suppose that at time T this property P(T) does not 
have a well-defined value because the quantum state of S is, say, a 50-50 
mixture of two different states with opposite values of P(T). Suppose the 
state of system S does not evolve after time T, and that a new measurement 
of the value of property P of S is performed here and now, and that some 
definite outcome, either “Yes” or “No”, appears here, according to whether 
the value of P is positive or negative. Quantum theory then predicts, via the 
creation of the corresponding new history, an associated reduction of the 
state of the now-faraway record of the value of earlier state P(T) of S.  
 
The existence of such a correlation is not problematic: it is completely 
normal and to-be-expected that the two measurement outcomes should be 
exactly correlated, and that the outcomes in both regions will be 50% “Yes” 
and 50% “No”. But suppose, to illustrate the point with an extreme example, 
that nature’s choice at the later time “now” of its answer to this particular 
probing question is biased, and delivers the outcome “Yes” 100% of the 
time. Then there will still be, because of the quantum redefinition of the 
past, an exact correlation between the two measurement outcomes: both will 
give “Yes” 100% of the time. Thus the biasing of nature’s choice of 
outcome pertaining to the system S being observed here and now will affect 
the preserved faraway record of the property P(T) of S at time T: the biasing 
of the outcome of the observation here and now will shift the result of the 
observation of the faraway record from 50% “Yes” and 50% “No” to 100% 
“Yes”. The biasing of nature’s response here and now has effectively 
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influenced the faraway record of the state of system S at the earlier time T, 
and influenced also all future predictions that depend upon the state of 
system S at time T. The biasing of the present choice has altered the effective 
past. 
 
If the question posed here and now about system S were, instead, a different 
question that nature answers in an unbiased way, then the orthodox rules 
entail that Nature’s (assumed unbiased) faraway choice of a response to the 
question of pertaining to the recorded measurement of  P(T) will be 50% 
“Yes” and 50% “No”. This means that the observer here, by his or her 
choice of what to measure now, at process time n can send a signal (a 
sender-controlled message) to the faraway region: the observer’s choice of 
what to observe here and now can influence the probabilities of the 
outcomes of probing actions performed at a later process time n’>n. The 
concepts of classical relativity theory break down. 
 
It is not so much that the normal history has been altered as that extra 
effective histories have been added, and these extra histories (of the 
universe) all lead to the favored outcome. Hence the faraway observed 
record, and all future observations, become altered by the biasing of nature’s 
choice at process time n. 
 
 
 
                            MATHEMATICAL DETAILS 
 
The description of orthodox quantum mechanics given above is a didactic 
equation-free account of what follows from the equations of quantum 
measurement theory. The mathematical details are given in this section.  
 
The mathematical representation of the dynamical process of measurement 
is expressed by the two basic formulas of quantum measurement theory:  
 
rho(n+1)Y = P(n+1) rho(n) P(n+1)/Trace (P(n+1) rho(n) P(n+1)), 
 
and  
 
<P(n+1)>Y= Trace (P(n+1) rho(n) P(n+1)) = Trace (P(n+1) rho(n)). 
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Here the integer “n” identifies an element in the global sequence of probing 
“measurement” actions. The symbol  rho(n) represents the quantum state 
(density matrix) of the observed physical system (ultimately the entire 
physically described universe, here assumed closed) immediately after the 
nth measurement action; P(n) is the (projection) operator associated with 
answer “Yes” to the question posed by the nth measurement action, and 
P’(n)= (I – P(n)) is analogous projection operator associated in the same way 
with the answer “No” to that question, with “I” the unit matrix. The formulas 
have been reduced to their essences by ignoring the unitary evolution 
between measurements, which is governed by the Schroedinger equation.   
 
The expectation value <P(n+1)>Y  is the normal orthodox probability that 
nature’s response to the question associated with P(n+1) will be “Yes”, and 
hence that rho(n+1) will be rho(n+1)Y . In the second equation I have used 
the defining property of projection operators, PP=P, and the general property 
of the trace operator: for any X and Y, Trace XY=Trace YX. (The trace 
operation is defined by: Trace M= Sum of the diagonal elements of the 
matrix M).  
 
Consider the familiar example of a pair of systems created in some space-
time region, and then traveling to two far-apart labs. The 
experimenter/observer in each lab chooses to measure some property of the 
system entering his lab. Let the probing actions in the first and second labs 
be associated with the projection operators P and Q, respectively. 
 
Suppose you, in your lab, decide to ask whether or not your experience will 
correspond to the reduction of the current state of the universe (defined by 
the density matrix rho) to the part of itself, P rho P, compatible with the 
experience PYes  = (The experience associated with the answer “Yes” to the 
question “Will my experience be the experience associated with the answer 
“Yes” to  the probing action associated with the projection operator P?). 
 
Suppose the observer in the other lab chooses to measure Q. If you know 
that the other observer is going to measure Q (i.e., is going to see whether 
nature responds ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the question “Will I,  the second 
experimenter/observer, experience the thought, feeling, or idea associated 
with Q?”) then how will your knowledge (merely) of what the second 
experimenter/observer is going to do---or has already done---(namely to 
choose to measure Q) going to affect your expectations pertaining to what 
you will see/experience?  
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The answer is “No Effect! “ --- provided the orthodox (pure chance) rules 
hold. 
 
The point is that the standard prediction in the case that the measurements 
corresponding to P and Q are performed in spacelike separated regions (so 
that PQ=QP) is that the probability of getting the pair of answers (PYes, 
QYes) is: 
 
<PQ>YY=Tr (PQ rho)     (Tr rho = 1). 
 
The probabilility of (PYes, QNo) is 
 
<P, I-Q>YN = Tr (P(I-Q) rho) .        
 
 
Hence your expectation <P>YQ  of getting the answer ‘Yes’  for P  if  you 
know (say by prearrangement) that the other experimenter/observer will 
choose to pose the question corresponding to Q, but have no knowledge of 
what the other outcome is (was, or will be), but know or believe that the 
usual statistical (chancy) rules of QM apply, is 
 
 <P>YQ  = <PQ>YY + (P(I-Q)>YN = Trace (PQ rho) + Trace (P(I-Q) rho)  
 
= Trace (P rho) =  <P>Y. 
 
due to the linearity of the Trace operation.  
 
Thus your expectation, and also the actual probability if the chancy rules 
really hold, is the same as if the other experiment (corresponding to Q) was 
not performed, or some different experiment (corresponding to Q1) was 
performed. This is the standard normal consequence of the chance-based 
theory: What happens “here” is independent of what is DONE faraway! This 
is an elementary, but important, consequence of orthodox QM. The normal 
statistical rule entails the normal causality rule that what a faraway 
experimenter freely decides to do “now” cannot affect what you will observe 
“here and now”!  
 
Normal causality ideas hold, provided the normal chancy probability rules 
hold! 
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But suppose nature’s choice of response does not conform to the orthodox 
statistical rule. Suppose, just to illustrate the main point with an extreme 
example, that nature’s choice is based on certain reasons, and is such that if 
the query corresponding to Q is posed, then nature’s answer will definitely 
be “Yes”. Then if the question corresponding to Q is posed, the probability 
of receiving the answer “Yes” to your local query corresponding to the local 
operator P will be 
 
<P>’YQ  = Trace [P ((Q rho Q)/Trace (Q rho Q))]  =  
 
Trace (PQ rho)/Trace (Q rho), 
 
where I have again used the projection operator condition QQ=Q,  
the fact that  PQ=QP, and the fact that, for any X and Y,  
Trace XY= Trace YX. 
 
The matrix ((Q rho Q)/Trace (Q rho Q)) occurring in the above formula is 
the density matrix that represents the facts that: 1) the original state (of the 
observed system) is rho; 2) the measurement corresponding to Q is 
performed; and 3) the outcome is definitely QYes.  
 
In this biased case, in which if Q is performed then nature definitely picks 
outcome QYes, the expectation <P>
 YQ  is no longer generally the same as 
<P>Y = (Trace P rho), which is what it would be if no question were posed 
faraway. For example, if rho specifies the condition of complete positive 
correlation of P and Q’,  
 
rho= (PQ’ +P’Q)/Trace(PQ’ + P’Q),   
 
then, from the above result, 
 
<P>’YQ  = (Trace PQ rho/Trace Q rho )= 0/Trace QP’, 
  
which is zero (because PP=P and PP’=0) for the general case in which P, P’, 
Q, and Q’ are all nonzero, whereas if no question is posed in the second 
region, or if the standard chancy rules hold, then the expectation for PYes is 
 
<P>Y  = Trace (P rho) = Trace P (PQ’ +P’Q)/ Trace(PQ’ + P’Q) 
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        = Trace PQ’/ Trace (PQ’ + P’Q).     
 
which is not equal to 0, for P and Q’ different from zero.   
 
Thus biasing the normal statistical rule produces violations of the normal 
causality rule, which asserts that what happens here does not depend upon 
what is freely/randomly chosen and done faraway! 
 
This close interlocking of the normal causality rule with the normal 
statistical rule is very well known, and was used in my theory of 
presentiment [7] to predict certain strong presentiment effects, within a 
quantum framework that allows a biasing of nature’s choice of which 
experience occurs, relative to the normal pure-chance-based rules. 
 
The bottom line is that biasing---relative to the normal orthodox chance-
based probabilities---of QYes, for the favored property Q, changes the  
probability associated with the other operator P that is---due to past 
interactions---correlated in rho with Q, even though P pertains to events in a 
region lying now far away from the region where the favored Q was chosen. 
The free choice of what to measure here now affects the probability for the 
outcome PYes to occur far away. And the property PYes can be a stored 
record of what occurred in the intersection of the backward light-cones of 
the regions in which P and Q are measured. The choice to measure the 
“favored” property Q---rather than some neutral property Q1---influences 
(the probability of the stored record P of) what occurred in the past.   
 
This result follows simply from direct application of the orthodox general 
rules of quantum mechanics, provided the statistical rules can be biased, 
relative to the normal rules governed by pure chance. 
 
In the Bem experiment with the erotic pictures let PER, P EL, PNR, and PNL   be 
the projection operators associated with the observation of the records of 
which picture was chosen to appear on which screen, with the subscripts E 
and N denoting erotic and non-erotic, respectively, and the subscripts R and 
L identifying right and left screens, respectively. Thus PER is the projection 
operator associated with the observable record of the fact that the erotic 
picture was picked and sent to the right-hand screen etc.  Let QER correspond 
to the observer-related question “Will I, the subject, see/experience the 
erotic picture if I open the right-hand screen”, etc..  Suppose that the subject 
has chosen the right-hand screen, and that the PRNG has chosen an erotic 
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picture, and that the RNG has generated a state that has the erotic picture 
placed in the right-hand screen with probability ½.  Then the density matrix 
rho for the combined PQ system just after the subject has physically 
interacted with the picture---which has, let us say, then faded away---but 
before nature’s choice of what will appear to the subject is  
 
rho = (QERPER   + Q0RPEL )/Trace (QERPER   + Q0RPEL), 
 
where Q0R  is operator that corresponds to the subject’s looking at the right-
hand screen and seeing no picture, and the two terms in the numerator have 
equal weights when traced. But if nature chooses to actualize experience ER 
with probability greater than Trace QER rho = ½, then one gets the 
retrocausal effect described above, and reported by Bem: the probability that 
experience ER will occur is greater than ½, and the probability that the 
observation of the faraway record associated with PER will give the answer 
“Yes” is likewise greater than ½, due to the linkage between QER  and PER 
via their common past. [The process-time machinery helps make clear what 
happens when the nature’s choices are allowed to be biased relative to the 
normal quantum statistical rules.] 
 
This result is basically a manifestation of the seeming breakdown of normal 
causality concepts if the normal statistical rules are not maintained.  
 
This dependence of normal causation upon the validity of the normal 
quantum rules of chance is, of course, well known! But the upshot here is 
the pertinent conclusion that making the dynamics more rational---by saying 
that nature’s choices have reasons, and are thus not purely random---makes 
the dynamics less causal.  
 
The failure of normal ideas about causation is achieved not by foisting some 
irrational or unnatural ad hoc condition on the dynamics, but rather by 
merely rationally insisting that the choices made by nature stem from 
sufficient reasons, and that two such reasons are to promote the positive and 
to curtail the negative experiences of observers. 
  
  
Such a proposal goes against what some scientists believe to be the proper 
duty of science and scientists, namely to refute any such idea of the non-
neutrality of nature in favor of the idea that nature maintains strict neutrality 
by playing dice with the universe--Einstein notwithstanding.  
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Science has certainly made great strides in reducing any clear need for a 
biasing of nature’s inputs into the physical dynamics. It is certainly 
worthwhile to pursue efforts to eliminate any empirically-mandated need for 
nature’s input into the quantum dynamics to be nonrandom, but not to the 
extent of banning from publication in scientific journals seemingly high 
quality reports of empirical results that appear to contradict the object of 
those endeavors. A scientific theory is immune to scientific falsification if 
the only evidence accepted in scientific discourse is data compatible with the 
current theory. 
 
If natural process does indeed involve a biasing of nature’s choices, then it 
may be of great practical importance for us to explore by the tools of science 
the details of the structure of this biasing, not merely to satisfy our idle 
curiosity, but also to allow us to use the thus-expanded science-based 
knowledge of the workings of nature to improve the quality of our lives.  
 
In Bem’s Experiment 2, “Precognitive Avoidance of (Subliminal) Negative 
Stimuli”, a long sequence of pairs of pictures is shown to the subject, who 
chooses a ‘preferred’ picture from each pair. After each such choice, an 
RNG  makes a random 50-50 choice of which picture in the pair to identify 
as the ‘target’, and then flashes a positive or negative subliminal picture 
according to whether this target is the preferred or un-preferred picture. If 
the targeting and associated subliminal stimulus were to occur before the 
subject’s choice of preferred picture then there would be no problem with 
empirical evidence that the positive and negative prior stimuli appear to 
influence the subject’s later choice of preference. But the normal idea of 
forward causation does not allow the targeting and associated stimulations 
that occur after the choice of preference to affect that earlier choice of 
preference. Yet Bem’s result is that the pictures chosen later as targets are 
more likely to be preferred earlier, compared to the pictures chosen later to 
be non-targets.  
 
This apparently retrocausal effect flows automatically from the assumption 
that nature’s choice of which outcome actually occurs has a tendency to 
accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative: such a putative biasing 
has the effect of adding to the density matrix rho, after nature’s biased 
choice, an abnormal term that corresponds to the addition of extra effective 
histories that lead to positive feelings, or to the elimination of effective 
histories that lead to negative feelings. These extra effective histories have 
essentially the same effect on the background state of the subject’s brain 
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during the process of his or her choice of pleasure versus nonpleasure as the 
normal effect of performing the brain-changing action before the subject’s 
choice of response. In both cases the effective state of the brain of the 
subject during his or her process of choosing is changed in essentially the 
same way: whether the change in the effective underlying background state 
of the subject’s brain comes from changes in earlier or later boundary 
conditions is not important. 
 
To achieve this explanation it must be recognized that the von Neumann 
process-1 action of posing a question identifies a complex property of the 
brain of the observing system that can be grasped as a meaningful idea-
representing whole: true consciousness is not demanded.  Such a 
subconscious form of process-1 action is probably needed also to provide a 
rationally coherent account of psychogenesis, from pre-biological times to 
the age of homo sapiens.     
 
Bem’s experiment 3 is “Retrocausal priming I”. A sequence of pictures is 
shown to the subject, who responds to each picture by pressing a first or 
second button according to whether he or she feels the picture to be pleasing 
or not. After the response of the subject to the picture is recorded, a ‘word’ is 
selected by a PRNG, and shown to the subject. This word will be either 
‘congruent’ or ‘incongruent’ with the picture: it will have either the same or 
opposite positive or negative valence. Bem reports that the recorded time 
that it takes for the subject to respond to the question of whether or not the 
picture is ‘pleasing’ is longer or shorter according to whether the 
subsequently chosen and displayed ‘word’ is congruent or not with the 
previously displayed picture. Again the question is: How can the recorded 
facts about what occurred earlier---in particular the response time---depend 
on which word was later randomly selected and shown to the subject? 
 
The answer is the same as before: the effective background state---positive 
or negative---in the extra effective histories created by nature’s biased 
response to the later priming is similar to the normal forward-in-time effect 
of the same priming: it matters little whether this influential background 
state is produced by an initial or a final boundary condition.  
 
The same general argument carries over to all nine of Bem’s experiments. 
Of course, the strength of the effect depends upon the power of the subject’s 
conscious or subconscious states to affect nature’s choices. This power 
appears to vary among subjects.  
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WHY DO THE NORMAL STATISTICAL RULES NORMALLY  
                                                  HOLD? 
 
Suppose that the Principle of Sufficient Reason does hold, so that each of 
nature’s choices has a reason to be what it turns out to be. And suppose that 
these reasons lead to choices that violate the orthodox statistical rules. Then 
violations of normal ideas about causation may occur. But the question then 
arises: Why do the normal orthodox quantum rules work as well as they do?  
 
The answer is that we considered above an extreme case in which there was 
a connection between P and an identified suspected cause Q. Normally there 
can be many entangled Q’s that could enter into nature’s sufficient reasons, 
and the favored-by-nature relevant variable Q (in our special case associated 
with the human subject’s emotional experience) will generally be 
unknowable to the observers of P.  In general the scientist will have no idea 
of which features of the world are driving nature’s choices in a given actual 
situation. In these usual cases the scientist must perform an averaging that 
reflects his ignorance. 
 
The usual classical way to represent a complete lack of knowledge about the 
variables in some domain is to average over the range of variables in that 
domain, ascribing equal weights to equal volumes of phase space. This is the 
weighting that is invariant under canonical transformations. The quantum 
analog is to take the Trace, which is invariant under unitary transformations, 
over the domain of factors about which we have no knowledge.  
 
A complete lack of knowledge about the identity of Q, means that we should 
average Q over the whole set of Q’s unitarily equivalent to it, within the full  
space in which it lies (which is a component of a tensor product of spaces), 
and about which we lack knowledge. But this averaging, needed to account 
for the lack of knowledge about what reasons are driving nature’s choices, 
will effectively erase all dependence on the variables about which one has 
no knowledge, and reduce the rule for computing expected probabilities to 
the usual quantum mechanical rules associated with the notion of pure 
chance. 
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In more detail the point is this. If nature’s choice has a reason, and this 
reason impels it to answer “Yes” to the posed question corresponding to Q,  
then the expectation  <P>’Q  of P, given that Q is performed and that 
nature’s answer to the Q  question is “Yes”, is 
 
 
<P>’Q  = Trace [P ((Q rho Q)/Trace (Q rho Q))]  
  
            = Trace PQ rho/Trace Q rho 
 
as already discussed. But suppose that Q is not known. Suppose, for 
example, that the various possible Q are identified by points on a circle, 
labeled by the angle θ, and that every point θ on the circle has equal a priori 
weight. Then the expectation of P is 
 
<P>’Q = Trace P(1/2pi)ʃdθ Q(θ) rho /Trace (1/2pi)ʃdθ Q(θ) rho. 
 
One must integrate over the unknown variable, assigning equal a priori 
weights to each possibility.   
 
In our case this example generalizes to 
 
<P>’Q=   [Trace (P Integral over all U  of  UQU` rho)]/ 
               [Trace (Integral over all U  of  UQU’ rho)] 
 
      = Trace (P rho)/Trace (rho) 
 
where U`is the Hermitian conjugate of U, and the integral is over the 
invariant Haar measure on the (compact) space of unitary matrices, and I 
have used the fact that 
 
(Sum over all U of   U Q U` ) = I (Trace Q/Trace I), 
 
where Q is a projection operator, I is the unit matrix/operator, U`  is the 
Hermitian Conjugate of U, and the sum over U is a sum over all unitary 
matrices U, with weights specified by the normalized invariant Haar 
measure, which is mapped invariantly onto itself under any unitary 
transformation from either left or right. 
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This result means that if Q is unknown then the probability <P> is just what 
is given by the usual pragmatic statistical rule, which, however, now arises 
from choices at the basic ontological level that accord with the principle of 
sufficient reason. 
 
 
       CONNECTION TO WHEELER’S DELAYED CHOICE 
 
The Bem backward-in-time effects can be viewed as a corollary of a well-
known backward-in-time property of QM, namely the Wheeler “delayed 
choice” effect, combined with a biasing---i.e., a violation---of the normal 
chancy weightings of nature’s choices of responses to probing actions 
pertaining to emotional states.   
 
As regards the standard Wheeler delayed-choice effect itself,  the orthodox 
theory entails that when nature makes her choice of response, the past is 
‘effectively reduced’ to the portion of the former past that fits smoothly onto 
the new, reduced, state of the universe, which nature has just chosen. The 
parts of the former past that conflict with nature’s current choice are 
effectively eliminated. Here “effectively” means “for the purpose of making 
predictions pertaining to the future”: As far as the potentialities for the next 
event are concerned, it is just “as if” the past were now “reduced” to that 
part of the former past that evolves into the new contemporary reality, 
created by nature’s current response, with the remainder of the former past 
suddenly eradicated.   
 
[Wheeler’s delayed choice experiment is essentially this: Suppose, during a 
double-slit experiment, at a time Tf before a photon reaches your eye, but 
after the photon has passed through the slits, you focus your vision on the 
slits through which photons that are coming, one at a time.  Then you will 
“see” that each photon passed at the earlier time T’---prior to your choice of 
how to focus your eyes---through one slit or the other, not both. But if at the 
later time Tf you choose to focus your eyes straight ahead then you will see 
the particles building up a pattern of stripes that depend upon the distance 
between the two slits, indicating that the wave packet went, at the earlier 
time T, through both slits: the later choice at time Tf on the part of the 
observer of what to observe influences the content of the effective quantum 
state at the earlier time T. This redefinition causes no conceptual problem in 
the orthodox theory because the physically described quantum state is not a 
material reality: it is merely a representation of potentialities for future 
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experiences of observers, and each of these experiences depend upon what 
the observer chooses to observe.  
 
The actual evolution proceeds in a well-ordered sequence, with each event 
associated with a finite (small) space-time region of zero temporal thickness, 
no part of which lies in the backward light-cone of any point in any of the 
regions associated with any earlier (in the ordered sequence of events) event. 
(See [9], Fig. 13.1) Each event creates a new effective past, but does not alter 
any past actual event.     
 
The notorious “nonlocality” feature of orthodox quantum mechanics can be 
attributed to this “delayed choice” effect of nature’s present choice upon the 
new effective past. This new effective past, created by the prolongation of 
the newly created present physical state into the past via the (inverse of) the 
Schroedinger equation, is only a portion of what was formerly present. The 
effective elimination of parts of the former past effectively eradicates the 
records of the parts of the past that have been eliminated.  Thus the 
reduction of the state rho associated with the measurement made here and 
now can affect the potentialities associated with faraway observations of 
records pertaining to what led up to the measurement made here and now. 
These retrocausal effects become, in this way, no longer a vague mysterious 
phenomena, but rather an understandable consequence of the elimination of 
pure chance from the basic quantum psychophysical laws of nature.  
 
 
 
                                      CONCLUSION 
 
Numerous reported seemingly backward-in-time causal effects are naturally 
explainable within forward-in-time orthodox quantum mechanics, provided 
the orthodox input of pure chance is replaced by the input of sufficient 
reason, with two such reason being the promotion of positive, and the 
suppression of negative, feelings, or their  subconscious relatives generated 
by subliminal stimuli. 
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